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ATTITUDINAL EFFECTS ON NUMERIC ANCHORING 
Abstract 
Recent research suggests that an attitude change perspective on anchoring offers important 
supplementation to existing theories of anchoring.  Past data has shown that people are more 
influenced by anchors when they are directionally consistent with their attitudes.  This could be a 
result of individuals seeking information that is consistent with their attitude.  This effect could 
also arise from differences in knowledge about the anchor.  The present research aims to 
distinguish between these two possibilities by manipulating attitude without changing knowledge 
about the anchoring target.  Experiment 1 established subliminal mere exposure of fictional 
brand names as a successful means of manipulating participants’ attitudes toward generic 
objects.  Experiment 2 revealed that participants assigned higher price evaluations to objects with 
previously exposed brand names.  Experiments 3a and 3b aimed to investigate the relationship 
between anchoring patterns and anchor-attitude consistency.  Data analysis for Experiments 3a 
and 3b only showed a main effect for anchoring.  Thus, a paradigm adjustment may be needed to 
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Attitudinal Effects on Numeric Anchoring:  
A Mere Exposure Approach 
 The phenomenon of numerical anchoring pertains to the unwarranted influence of a given 
starting point on subsequent judgments.  Early research pertaining to numerical anchoring 
explained the influence of random initial numbers on judgments through use of an anchor-and-
adjust heuristic.  Though people adjust responses to overtly under/overestimated anchors in the 
right direction, these responses are not sufficiently adjusted (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).  
Quattrone, Lawrence, Warren, Souza-Silva, Finkel and Andrus (1984) extrapolated on this 
heuristic, suggesting that people form boundary values pertaining to specific target objects.  
People are expected to adjust away from extreme anchoring values until this boundary of 
plausibility is reached.  Thus, no matter how extreme an anchor might be, when it lies outside of 
plausibility boundaries, adjustments should take judgments back to the nearest boundary of the 
plausibility range.   
 While the aforementioned numerical anchoring heuristics are still widely discussed, more 
complex anchoring theories have emerged.  For example, Klayman and Ha (1987) ascertained 
that people perform hypothesis testing when presented with a novel piece of information.  This 
“confirmatory search” process is accomplished by recalling information pertaining to or 
comparative to the proposed fact or statistic.  Chapman and Johnson (1994) then related this 
theory of hypothesis testing processes to anchoring.  When a “confirmatory search” process is 
performed in response to an anchor, the individual tests how an answer to the question might be 
similar to the given anchor.  Similarities between the target object and the anchor, thus, become 
more salient and accessible.  This mechanism for anchoring is known as the selective 
accessibility approach (Strack & Mussweiler 1997).  Some research has integrated the selective 
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accessibility and anchor and adjust models, showing that people effortfully adjust away from 
anchors in conditions of directional certainty (Simmons, LeBoeuf, & Nelson, 2010).   
 Besides the classic anchor-and-adjust and selective accessibility approaches, new theories 
of anchoring have evolved that take into consideration the Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; 
Petty & Cacioppo, 1986).  In this recent perspective on anchoring, anchor values sometimes 
serve as simple cues that influence judgments rather directly, but at other times they serve to bias 
more effortful thinking about a judgment (Petty & Wegener, 1998, 1999).  Thus, consistent with 
the ELM, anchoring, like attitude change, should have more lasting effects when thoughtful 
elaboration processes are carried out.  Consistent with this idea, anchoring effects last longer and 
are more resistant to attempts at later social influence of responses when initial anchoring effects 
occur in relatively thoughtful rather than nonthoughtful settings (Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, 
Detweiler-Bedell, & Macy, 2008).   
 Because the implications of attitude change theories of numerical anchoring present 
evidence that is not addressed in well-established and classical theories, research involving 
attitude change and anchoring seemed highly worthwhile.  In Dr. Wegener’s lab at Ohio State 
University, previously collected data examines relations between people’s existing attitudes and 
the effects of anchors that are directionally consistent or inconsistent with the anchor.  When an 
anchor was consistent with the person’s attitude (e.g., a person opposing the war in Iraq 
receiving an anchor suggesting a large number of civilian casualties), the anchor had greater 
influence on people’s judgments than when the anchor was inconsistent with the person’s 
attitude (e.g., a person supporting the war in Iraq receiving an anchor suggesting a large number 
of civilian casualties).  This type of effect is reasonable, but can be interpreted in different ways.  
It could be that people would prefer to seek out information consistent with anchors that fit rather 
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than conflict with their existing attitudes, and this motivation slants the type of confirmatory 
testing in which people engage.  For example, Blankenship et al. (2008) found that when 
participants were able to think about their judgments, anchor-consistent background knowledge 
enhanced the anchoring effect. Alternatively, such an effect may stem from difference in 
attitudes simply reflecting differences in judgment-related knowledge, such that people can find 
more anchor-consistent information in memory when the anchor is consistent with their attitudes. 
In order to distinguish between these possibilities, it seemed necessary to conduct a study in 
which the attitudes are changed without changing the content of knowledge people have about 
the object or objects.  One way to do that is to attempt to change attitudes through repeated 
exposure of the attitude object (Bornstein, 1989).   
 Experiments 1 and 2 established subliminal mere exposure as an effective means to 
influence attitudes.  Experiment 3a and 3b aimed to investigate the relationship between attitude-
anchor consistency and anchored judgment magnitude.  More specifically, it was predicted that 
numerical changes in participants’ anchored judgments would be enhanced when the direction of 
the anchor was consistent rather than inconsistent with the evaluation of the object. 
 
Experiment 1 
 Experiment 1 assessed whether subliminal exposure of brand names affected subsequent 
preferences of branded objects.  It has been shown that exposure to initially neutral words 
increases raters’ liking of the words (Bornstein, 1989; Zajonc, 1968).  Overall, the mere exposure 
effect is shown to be particularly strong under subliminal conditions (e.g., Bornstein & 
D’Agostino, 1992; Bornstein, Leone, & Galley, 1987; Janiszewski, 1988, 1993; Kunst-Wilson & 
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Zajonc, 1980).  Thus, subliminal exposure of hypothetical brand names seemed to be a logical 




Seventy-four undergraduate approached in the main library of The Ohio State University 
volunteered to participate in this study.  
Design 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a between-subjects 
design.  Two sets of neutral fictional brand names (“A” and “B” brand sets) were created for the 
research project.  Participants were subliminally exposed to either the A set of brands or the B set 
of brands.  Effects of this exposure were documented through choices in a forced-choice task 
comparing one object with a previously exposed brand name with a similar object with a novel 
brand name. 
 Materials 
 A laptop computer was used to collect all data for Experiment 1.  The experiment was 
run using DirectRT software (Jarvis, 2008). 
Procedure 
 After opting to participate in the study, participants were told that they would be judging 
a series of novel stimuli.  The introduction screen also stated that the stimuli may be impossible 
to perceive, but it was important to keep looking at the screen.  In the mere exposure segment of 
the study, subjects were subliminally exposed to one of two possible sets of brand names (i.e., 
the A set or the B set; see Figure 1).  The four brands were presented ten times each at 17ms 
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exposures for a total of forty subliminal exposures.  Previous research shows that presentations 
of words at 17ms are not consciously perceptible to participants (e.g., Fishbach, Friedman, & 
Kruglanski, 2003; Shah & Kruglanski, 2002).  A mask of Xs created a focus point for 
participants and ensured subliminal exposure by compensating for after effects.  The mask 
appeared for 500ms between each subliminal brand presentation.
 
 Upon completion of the exposure segment of the study, participants were presented with 
two notebooks in a forced choice paradigm.  One notebook was labeled with an A brand, while 
the second notebook was labeled with a B brand (see Figure 2).  No other features besides the 
brand names on the notebooks differed. 
Results 
 Participants expressed their preference between two branded notebooks four times during 
Experiment 1.  Data analysis focused on the proportion of A brand notebooks chosen by 
participants as a function of previous exposure to A versus B brands.  As predicted, individuals 
subliminally exposed to A brands chose a higher proportion of A brands (M = .61, SD = .25, N = 
34) than individuals subliminally exposed to B brands (M = .48, SD = .24, N = 40), t(72) = 2.16, 
p = .034, two-tailed. 
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Experiment 2 
 The results of Experiment 1 replicated findings of many previous studies, showing that 
object liking and preference are influenced by subliminal mere exposure (Bornstein, 1989).  
Thus, manipulating attitude formations toward a specific set of objects could be accomplished 
through the branding paradigm of Experiment 1 (cf. Hansen & Wanke, 2009).  Because 
subsequent studies would involve numerical anchoring tasks, it seemed necessary to relate 
attitudinal evaluations of the branded objects to numerical values.  It was predicted that a more 
favorable attitude toward a branded object would correspond to a higher price evaluation of the 
object.  In Experiment 2, it was hypothesized that participants would assign higher price 
valuations to generic objects when the item’s brand name had been subliminally exposed in the 
preceding mere exposure segment.   
Methods 
 Participants 
 Sixty-nine introductory psychology students from The Ohio State University participated 
in the study.  The enrollees in Experiment 2 received credit for an undergraduate class’s research 
experience requirement. 
Design 
 Experiment 2 was a repeated measures design.  The independent variable was subliminal 
exposure to either A or B brands.  Participants’ price evaluations of branded objects were 
measured.  For each participant, price estimates were measured for both A brand objects and B 
brand objects.     
 Materials 
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 The data for Experiment 2 were collected on desktop computers in a laboratory setting.  
The experiment was run using DirectRT software (Jarvis, 2008). 
Procedure 
After agreeing to participate in 
the study, participants were informed 
that they would be judging a series of 
novel stimuli.  Like Experiment 1, the 
introduction screen stated that the 
stimuli may be impossible to perceive, 
but it was important to keep looking at 
the screen.  Affectively neutral stimuli were presented for one second intervals during the mere 
exposure segment in order to increase participant’s attention to the computer monitor (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008).  These pictures were unrelated to the stimuli used during the 
judgment phase of the study (when the objects were accompanied by the brand names). During 
the mere exposure segment, participants were subliminally exposed ten times to either the four A 
brand names or the four B brand names from Experiment 1.  In all, each participant experienced 
forty subliminal (17ms) exposures to brand names from either the A set or B set.  After the 
exposures, individuals were asked to estimate branded objects’ costs.  Participants chose one of 
nine listed prices arrayed along a continuum (from 1 to 9 based on ranges of values that pretest 
participants identified as plausible for each object; see Figure 3).  In Experiment 2, the branded 
objects included scissors, pens, screwdrivers, and rulers.  Subjects’ price evaluations were given 
for both A brand objects and B brand objects.  In other words, within a large set of ratings, 
participants encountered and rated four pairs of objects consisting of two items that varied only 
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in brand and orientation during the study.  Orientation varied by a rotation of ninety degrees 
between the objects.  Because of the repeated measures nature of the study, participants also 
estimated the cost of twenty filler items (ten pairs of filler items).  The filler items were a series 
of generic objects such as dice, calculators, notebooks, lighters, and toothbrushes.  The order of 
items presented in this phase was randomized for each participant.   
Results 
 Mean price estimates were calculated for objects branded with previously exposed brand 
names and objects branded with brand names that were not subliminally exposed.  Data analysis 
focused on a comparison of mean price estimates between the exposure and no exposure branded 
objects.  As predicted, results from a repeated measures t-test showed that individuals were 
willing to pay more for objects when they had been subliminally exposed to their brand names 
(M = 4.15, SD = 1.35, N = 69) as compared to objects with no exposure to brand names (M = 
3.97, SD = 1.15, N = 69), t(68) = 2.01, p = .048, two-tailed.  Additional data analysis showed no 
main effect for brand exposed (A or B), and there was no significant interaction between brand 
exposed (A or B) and exposure level (exposure and no exposure).   
  
Experiment 3a 
 Experiment 1 established subliminal mere exposure as a means to manipulate attitude.  
Experiment 2 showed that subliminal exposure to brand names resulted in higher price 
evaluations of objects branded with the subliminally presented brands.  Experiment 3a aimed to 
examine whether these evaluative differences across objects could influence the extent to which 
numerical anchors influenced the price estimates.  In Experiment 3a, participants underwent the 
same subliminal mere exposure segment as Experiment 2.  However, before giving price 
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evaluations in the subsequent task, high or low anchors were displayed to the participants.  It was 
predicted that when anchors were consistent with attitudes (e.g., high anchors are consistent with 
positive evaluations of objects), the anchor would have a greater influence on individuals’ 




 Sixty-four introductory psychology students from The Ohio State University participated 
in the study.  The enrollees in Experiment 3a received credit for an undergraduate class’s 
research experience requirement.  
 Design 
 Experiment 3a was a 2x2 mixed design.  The between subjects variables were anchor 
level (high or low) and subliminal exposure to either the A set of brands or the B set of brands.  
The repeated measures was in evaluating the prices of both objects with previously exposed and 
with previously unexposed brand names.  
 Materials 
 The data for Experiment 3a was collected on desktop computers in a laboratory setting.  
The experiment was run using DirectRT software (Jarvis, 2008). 
 Procedure 
 The mere exposure segment of Experiment 3a was identical to the subliminal mere 
exposure session in Experiment 2.  After subliminal exposure to either A or B brands, subjects 
performed an anchored price evaluation task.  A classical anchoring paradigm was used for 
Experiment 3a.  Participants were first asked a comparative judgment of whether they would pay 
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more or less than a given price for an object in a store.  The high and low anchor prices were set 
one standard deviation above and below the mean price estimates of a calibration group.  
Participants were then asked to give an absolute judgment of price (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).  
The absolute price estimation task was identical to Experiment 2, and participants chose one of 
nine listed prices arrayed along a continuum (See Fig. 3.).  The order of items encountered 
within the anchoring task in Experiment 3a was counterbalanced to avoid order effects.      
Results 
 An independent samples t-test showed a main effect for anchoring.  The price estimates 
of individuals exposed to high anchors (M = 4.91, SD = 1.29, N = 32) were significantly higher 
than the price estimates of participants exposed to low anchors (M = 3.27, SD = 1.19, N = 32), 
t(62) = 5.27, p < .001, two-tailed.  Participants’ average price estimates were calculated for 
objects labeled with exposed brand names and for objects labeled with brands that were not 
exposed.  To test the main effect of previous exposure of the brand names, a difference score was 
calculated by subtracting the no exposure object price estimates from the exposure object price 
estimates.  It was predicted that the difference scores would be significantly larger than zero.  A 
one sample t-test showed no main effect for mere exposure (p = .724).  It was hypothesized that 
the anchoring effect would be greater when anchor value matched (i.e., high anchor with 
previously exposed brands and low anchor with previously unexposed brands) rather than 
mismatched the mere-exposure condition.  A mixed factorial ANOVA showed no such trend (p 
= .726).  Thus, there was no anchor x match interaction detected. The results of Experiment 3a 
were not supportive of the prediction that anchors that are numerically consistent with attitudes 
have a stronger influence on subsequent numerical judgments.   
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Experiment 3b 
 Experiment 3a failed to show a main effect for mere exposure alongside the main effect 
of anchor.  This result could possibly mean that the anchoring effect overwhelms the subliminal 
mere exposure effect.  In a meta-analysis of mere exposure studies from 1968-1987, Bornstein 
(1989) showed that subliminal mere exposure effects were very reliable, but not particularly 
large.  Anchoring effects are quite strong, and experience in Dr. Wegener’s lab suggests that 
anchoring effects are almost always present, even with limited sample sizes.  It was speculated 
that the high and low anchors in Experiment 3a were overwhelming the subliminal mere 
exposure attitude manipulation.  In an attempt to weaken the anchoring effect to possibly allow 
for mere exposure effects to operate in conjunction with the anchoring effect, in Experiment 3b, 
the anchors were made less extreme in magnitude.   
Methods 
 Participants 
 Sixty-six introductory psychology students from The Ohio State University participated 
in the study.  The enrollees in Experiment 2 received credit for an undergraduate class’s research 
experience requirement. 
 Procedure 
 The design and materials in Experiment 3b were identical to Experiment 3a.  The 
procedure for Experiment 3b was also very similar to Experiment 3a and differed only in anchor 
extremity.  In Experiment 3a anchor values were set one standard deviation above and below the 
mean price estimates of a calibration group.  In Experiment 3b anchor values were set at one half 
of a standard deviation above and below the mean price estimates of the same calibration group.   
Results 
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 An independent samples t-test showed a main effect for anchoring that bordered on 
significance.  The price estimates of individuals exposed to high anchors (M = 4.86, SD = 1.30, 
N = 33) were higher than the price estimates of participants exposed to low anchors (M = 4.24, 
SD = 1.46, N = 33), t(64) = 1.84, p = .070, two-tailed.  As with Experiment 3a, there was no 
main effect for mere exposure (p = .252).  There was also no significant anchor x match 
interaction (p = .255). 
 
Discussion 
 According to attitude change theories, people tend to seek out information that is 
consistent with their own attitudes (Festinger, 1957).  Motivation to seek attitude-consistent 
information could subsequently bias confirmatory testing.  Thus, it is reasonable to predict that 
attitudinally consistent anchors will often have a larger impact on anchored judgments than 
attitudinally inconsistent anchors.  When such effects are because of differences in knowledge 
underlying the attitudes, they fit well with previous research on background knowledge and 
anchoring (e.g., Blankenship et al., 2008; Mussweiler & Strack, 2001).  In the current research, 
however, we hoped to provide evidence that the attitudes themselves might influence the search 
process to change the resulting effects of attitude-(in)consistent anchors.  In order to do so, we 
sought to manipulate attitudes without providing information about the attitude objects.  
Subliminal mere exposure was chosen as an attitude manipulator, because evaluations of objects 
may be improved without recognition of previous exposure to stimuli.   
 Experiment 1 replicated the findings of many experiments, and showed that subliminal 
mere exposure to brand names increased the liking of branded objects.  Experiment 2 revealed 
that mere exposure to brand names translated into higher price evaluations.  Experiments 3a and 
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3b produced a main effect for anchoring, but failed to confirm that attitudinally consistent 
anchors have a greater impact on anchored estimates than attitudinally inconsistent anchors.  
Thus, it seems in Experiments 3a and 3b that explicit consideration of the anchor values 
overshadowed any evaluative effects of the mere exposure. 
 An attitudes and persuasion perspective offers some plausible explanations for the lack of 
an interaction between anchor and anchor-attitude consistency.  An attitudinal approach to 
anchoring describes the anchor as serving “multiple roles” (Blankenship, Wegener, Petty, 
Detweiler-Bedell, & Macy, 2008).  For example, similar to persuasion factors in the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986), anchors can promote effortful thinking or serve as 
non-thoughtful cues.  In the classical anchoring paradigm used in Experiments 3a and 3b, 
effortful thinking most likely occurs, and participants probably generated anchor-consistent 
knowledge.  Mussweiler and Strack (2001) state that a standard anchoring task ‘‘appears to 
involve a relatively elaborate process of testing the hypothesis that the target quantity may be 
similar to the comparison standard” (p. 252).  If such a highly elaborative process does occur 
during the anchoring process, it is possible that mere exposure effects would be diminished.  The 
cognitive evaluations that occur during biased processing of the anchor may overwhelm the 
affective attitude manipulation of subliminal mere exposure.  We hoped that the exposure-based 
attitudes would be sufficient to bias processing of the object in an attitude-consistent direction, 
but it could be that direct thoughts about the objects and anchors themselves were more salient to 
participants than any (potentially fleeting) evaluations based on the familiarity of the brand 
name. 
 Future research should focus on implementing an anchoring paradigm that does not 
diminish the mere exposure effect.  One possible course of research is to introduce anchors in an 
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incidental manner.  In other words, the initial comparative question of a standard anchoring 
paradigm would be avoided, and the numerical anchors would be incidentally present in the 
environment (Critcher & Gilovich, 2008).  Incidental anchors have the potential to act as simple 
magnitude primes, and can have an impact without elaborative thought about the judgment 
target.  In this circumstance, it is conceivable that individuals would rely on their attitudes (in 
addition to the incidental anchors) formed by mere exposure when judging object values. 
 Besides changing the anchoring paradigm, future research could also concentrate on 
developing a more effective attitude manipulation.  For example, an implicit attitude formation 
procedure via classical conditioning could be an alternative manipulation of attitudes that does 
not increase knowledge about attitude objects.  Such a paradigm is described by Olson and Fazio 
(2001).   
 Since Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) groundbreaking publication, the anchoring effect 
has been easy to produce, but difficult to explain.  Modern anchoring theories such as 
confirmatory hypothesis testing (Chapman & Johnson, 1994) and selective accessibility (Strack 
& Mussweiler 1997) made important strides in elucidating the mechanisms behind anchoring.  
However, recent research suggests that an attitudes and persuasion perspective of anchoring may 
offer important insights into the idiosyncrasies of anchoring.  Further research from an attitudes 
and persuasion standpoint appears useful in creating a more comprehensive understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying anchoring.        
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